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Abstract—An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on
AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on
the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding
the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level optimiza-
tion problem is introduced whose objective is to maximize the
physical line flows subsequent to an FDI attack on DC SE. The
maximization is subject to constraints on both attacker resources
(size of attack) and attack detection (limiting load shifts) as well
as those required by DC optimal power flow (OPF) following
SE. The resulting attacks are tested on a more realistic non-
linear system model using AC state estimation and ACOPF, and
it is shown that, with an appropriately chosen sub-network, the
attacker can overload transmission lines with moderate shifts of
load.
Index Terms—false data injection, state estimation, optimiza-
tion, vulnerability analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the increasing integration of real-time monitor-ing, sensing, control, and communication, the electric
power systems are becoming increasingly efficient and con-
trollable. However, the tight integration also makes the system
more vulnerable to cyber attacks with potentially serious
physical consequences. Therefore, assessment and evaluation
of possible attacks and consequences before an actual attack
happens is extremely instructive to the utilities: procedures
for detecting potential attack incidents is an important supple-
ments to the secure operation of the power system.
There is much interest in studying cyber attacks on the
electric power system. This includes attacks on system states
[1]–[6], system topology [7], [8], generator dynamics [9], and
energy markets [10]–[12]. While several classes of cyber-
attacks have been identified, consequences of such attacks on
the electric power system are less understood. It is this aspect
that we focus on in this paper. To this end, we introduce a class
of false data injection (FDI) attacks on AC state estimation
(SE) designed to cause physical line overflows. In fact, such
an attack can potentially lead to cascading failures since a
sustained attack can ensure that the physical line overflow is
not detected through the cyber measurements.
A. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we
introduce a sophisticated unobservable attack on AC state
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estimation that takes into account the sequential data pro-
cessing functionalities in the cyber layer of the electric power
system (see Fig. 1). Our attack models a sophisticated attacker
with access to measurements in a small sub-network and with
the intention of creating significant changes to the physical
network that can have potentially damaging consequences,
if undetected. Enabling physical consequences requires the
attacker to change measurements that leads to redispatch,
and eventually, line overloads. To this end, we formulate a
bi-level attack optimization problem with the objective of
causing a physical line overflow via an unobservable attack
on AC state estimation subject to constraints on: (i) number
of meters to attack (limited resources constraint) and (ii)
load shifts (to limit operator detection). Since a line overflow
requires modeling the system level redispatch subsequent to
the attack, our optimization problem has embedded in it a
second level redispatch optimization problem. The second
contribution of our work is to highlight the consequences of
our proposed attack on a non-linear system model with AC SE
and ACOPF. We use the optimal attack vector obtained from
our optimization problem to do so. We show that our attack
model can successfully lead to line overflows for an RTS-24-
bus system with moderate load shifts and attack sizes.
B. State of the Art
FDI attacks have gained much interest in the literature
starting from Liu et al.’s work on unobservable attacks on
DC SE [1]. Their work shows that an attacker can change
the system state without being detected by the bad data
detection algorithm within SE if the attack vector is chosen
judiciously to mimic typical SCADA measurements. Kosut et
al. discuss the trade-off between maximizing estimation error
at the control center and minimizing detection probability of
the attack [3].
For attacks restricted to a sub-network of the system net-
work graph, the authors in [13] introduce an algorithm to
determine an attack subgraph and show that such a sub-
network must be bounded by buses with injections. Further-
more, the authors also show that a sophisticated attack using
AC SE requires the attacker to estimate the system states for
its subgraph. Recently, in [14], we build upon [13] to introduce
an AC attack restricted to a subgraph and show that it suffice
for the attacker to perform local SE to launch an unobservable
attack.
In this paper we extend [14] to study attack consequence. To
this end, we use an attack subgraph and determine the optimal
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2attack via a bi-level optimization problem. Bi-level attack
optimization problems in the context of attacks are considered
in [15]–[17]. In all cases, the optimization problems include
both the attacker’s goal (unobservable attack on DC SE)
as well as the ensuing system response (OPF), leading to
a bi-level optimization problem. However, the goal of the
optimization in the aforementioned papers is to increase the
operating costs for the system. While costs are relevant to the
electric power system operation, cyber attacks with physical
consequences can be more damaging.
The optimization problems in [16] and [17] take into
account the fact that FDI attacks lead to an inevitable load shift
at the buses in the subgraph and include a constraint on the
load shift magnitude to limit detection. In this paper, we take
this a step further and restrict not only the load shift magnitude
but also the size of attack subgraph to simultaneously model
the observability and limited resources constraints.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec.
II introduces the general system and attack model. Sec. III
discusses the different attack strategies for unobservable at-
tacks. Sec. IV presents a bi-level optimization formulation to
identify the worst-case overflow attack. Sec. V presents and
analyzes the numerical results for a test system. Sec. VI draws
the conclusion of this paper and presents the direction of future
works.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION: SYSTEM AND ATTACK
MODEL
A. Temporal nature processing of the grid
Fig. 1 illustrates the temporal nature of processing in the
grid and the attack model. Assume a system with nb buses,
nbr branches, and ng generators. Active and reactive load
of each buses are represented by PL and QL, respectively.
Measurement and estimated measurement residue are denoted
as z and r, respectively. In the bad data detector, τ is the
residue threshold and x = [V , θ]T is the system state, where
V is bus voltage magnitude and θ is bus voltage angle. The
function h(·) denotes the non-linear function that gives the
measurements. This function depends only on the system
topology. Estimated values are denoted with a hat, e.g. xˆ, Vˆ , θˆ.
As shown in Fig. 1, generation dispatch control decisions
made at the control center depend on the noisy measurements
provided by the SCADA system. If these measurements are
corrupted by an attacker and pass the bad data detector, they
can directly influence the control decisions for the next time
interval. Since the process occurs in the same manner for each
time t, we drop the functional dependence on t for the rest of
this section. The major blocks shown in Fig. 1 are discussed
in detailed in the following subsections.
B. Measurements
The AC measurement model follows the non-linear relation-
ship
z = h(x) + e. (1)
where z, e and x are m × 1, m × 1 and n × 1 vectors with
entries zi, ei and xk, respectively i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. zi is the ith measurement of the system: line power
flows, bus voltage and line current magnitude, etc. ei is the ith
measurement error, assuming to be independent and Gaussian
distributed with 0 mean and σ2i covariance.
C. State estimation
As illustrated in Fig. 1, all raw measurements are first
passed through an observability check. If there are enough
measurements, the system will be observable; otherwise, the
system is divided into several observable islands.
State estimation is used to determine the most likely state
of the system given the available noisy measurements. In AC
state estimation, the state variables are solved as a least square
problem with an objective function [18]
xˆ = argmin J(x) = (h(x)− z)TR−1(h(x)− z) (2)
where R = diag{σ21 , σ22 , . . . , σ2m} and xˆ = [Vˆ , θˆ]T is the
estimated state.
Subsequent to SE, the bad data detector filters noisy mea-
surement and guarantees the accuracy of estimation, using χ2
test.
D. AC and DC optimal power flow
The AC optimal power flow (OPF) takes the following form:
minimize
x
f(PG)
subject to G(x) = 0 (3)
F (x) ≤ 0 (4)
xmax ≤ x ≤ xmax (5)
where f(.) is the generation cost function and x =
[V , θ, PG, QG]T is the variable of the optimization problem.
Inequality constraint, i.e. the line thermal limits, is denoted
as F and equality constraint, i.e. the node power balance is
denoted as G. Both F and G are non-linear constraints, since
there are active and reactive power involved.
DCOPF approximates G and F around V = 1, θ = 0 by
their first order Taylor expansion:
minimize
θ,PG
f(PG)
subject to −H1θ + PG − PL = 0 (6)
− Pmax ≤ H2θ ≤ Pmax (7)
PminG ≤ PG ≤ PmaxG . (8)
where
• H1 is the matrix of dependencies between power injection
and state θ.
• H2 is the matrix of dependencies between branch power
flow and state θ.
• Pmax is the thermal limit.
• PminG and P
max
G are the generator capacity lower and
upper limit, respectively.
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Figure 1. Illustration of temporal processing of the grid and attack model.
E. Attack model
We first assume that the attacker has following capabilities:
1) The attacker has access to all measurements and topology
information of a small area S bounded by buses. The set
of all measurement indices in S is denoted as IS and the
set of all state indices in S is denoted as KS .
2) The attacker can change or replace all measurements in
S.
3) The attacker has computational capability.
As discussed in [14], according to (1), suppose the ith
measurement prior to attack is zi = hi(x) + ei, the general
attack model changes the ith measurement zi to z
(a)
i such that
z
(a)
i =
{
zi
z˜i
if i /∈ IS
if i ∈ IS
(9)
where z˜i is chosen by attacker.
III. ATTACK STRATEGY
A. Unobservable attack
Definition 1. An attack is unobservable for a measurement
model h(·) if, in the absence of measurement noise, there
exists a c 6= 0 such that z(a)i = hi(x+ c) for all i.
Therefore, for the attacker to execute an unobservable
attack, again assuming no measurement noise, (9) becomes
z
(a)
i =
{
zi
hi(x+ c)
if i /∈ IS
if i ∈ IS .
(10)
From (10), if the kth state xk is required to compute
hi(x) for any i /∈ IS , then for any unobservable attack the
corresponding kth entry in attack vector must satisfy ck = 0.
That is, for an attack region S, not all the bus states in it
can be changed. The attack region must be bounded by a
set of buses without state changes however with measurement
changes. To identify such a collection of one or more buses
in S, we first distinguish between two types of buses based
on the presence of load. We henceforth identify buses with
load as load buses. Kload denotes the bus indices of load bus.
An attacker can attack either type of bus. However, since the
injections of non-load buses are known to the control center,
attacking a non-load bus implies that the measurements at
the closest load buses also need to be changed to ensure that
the nodal power balance is maintained. In [13], a method is
introduced to identify a subgraph of the network that allows an
attacker to perform an unobservable attack. We use a similar
method, as summarized as follow. Let k be a target load
bus, the corresponding single-target-bus attack subgraph Sk
is constructed by following steps:
1) Include bus k in Sk.
2) Extend Sk from bus k by including all buses and branches
that are connected to bus k.
3) If there is a non-load bus on the boundary of Sk, extend
Sk to include all adjacent buses of such a boundary bus.
4) Repeat (3) until all buses on the boundary are load buses
or Sk can not be extended anymore.
The steps above give an attack subgraph that includes the
target load bus and is bounded by load buses. Fig. 2 shows
two simple examples of single-target-bus attack subgraphs.
The choice of the final attack subgraph S, however, can be
a union of several single-target-bus attack subgraphs:
S =
⋃
k : ck 6=0∩k∈Kload
Sk. (11)
This choice of attack subgraph results in estimated load
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Figure 2. Examples of single-target-bus attack subgraph. Fig. 2a shows the
subgraph with target bus 1 and Fig. 2b shows the subgraph with target bus 2.
changes at all load bus within S while no net load changes in
the system.
B. DC attack
Since (10) is nonlinear and generally hard to solve, it is
reasonable for the attacker to first consider a simplified DC
attack. As [1] demonstrated, by knowing system Jacobian ma-
trix H , an attacker can intelligently construct an unobservable
attack vector a = Hc such that z(a)i = zi + a.
Thus, (10) becomes
z
(a)
i =
{
zi
zi +H(i,:)c
if i /∈ ISP
if i ∈ ISP
(12)
where, IP denotes the set of indices of active power mea-
surements, ISP = IS ∩ IP , and H(i,:) denotes the ith row of
H .
Though DC attack is easy to construct, it is not an unob-
servable attack for AC state estimator. Without taking reactive
power flow into account, a DC attack will be detected when
c is too large.
C. AC attack
From (10), in contrary to DC attack, it seems that the
attacker must know all the state values that appear in hi(.), for
all i ∈ IS , to construct zi precisely. However, this information
is not available to the attacker. Thus, attacker can use the
following steps to construct z(a)i :
1) The attacker first chooses the non-zero entries in c only
for the load buses. These non-zero entries correspond to
the center buses for the attack subgraph.
2) Use the protocol in Sec. III-A and choose S for the
desired attack.
3) Given the measurements that are available to the attacker
in S, perform local AC state estimation to find xˆ(a)k . The
slack bus may be chosen arbitrarily among all load buses.
4) For all load buses k, set x(a)k = xˆ
(a)
k + ck.
5) Since the injection of non-load buses can not be changed,
the states of non-load buses are dependent on the state
of all the buses that connected to them. Therefore, the
attacker has the nodal balance equation for each non-load
bus k in S:
Pinjk = Vk
∑
i∈Nk
Vi(Gkicosθki +Bkisinθki) (13)
Qinjk = Vk
∑
i∈Nk
Vi(Gkisinθki −Bkicosθki) (14)
where Gki + jBki is the (k, i)th entry of the complex
bus admittance matrix and θki = θk − θi is the angle
difference between bus k and i. These equations can
be solved by iterative methods such as Newton-Raphson
method.
6) With all the computed state information, the attacker can
therefore compute the false measurements z(a) such that
z
(a)
i =
{
zi
hi(x
(a))
if i /∈ IS
if i ∈ IS .
(15)
IV. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR THE WORST-CASE LINE
OVERLOAD ATTACK
The aim of the unobservable attack is to maximize the
physical line flow for a chosen line in the attack subgraph.
However, the attacker, in general, has limited resources to
change states; furthermore, the attacker would also like to
design the attack to avoid detection over the various comput-
ing units in EMS. This leads to a constrained optimization
problem. Specifically, we model the two conflicting goals
of the attacker as follows: the limited resource constraint
is modeled by a sparsity constraint in which we limit the
number of center buses at which states can be changed. The
detectability constraint is modeled by limiting the cyber load
shifts that result from the FDI attacks. This is because a large
deviation in estimated load from normal operational values
will be detected as an anomalous event by the operators. The
sparsity constraint capturing the limited resource is modeled
as an l0-norm constraint. This is, in general, intractable, and
therefore, we relax it to an l1-norm constraint. In addition
to the two constraints, since the physical line flow is a
consequence of the control center re-dispatch generation, the
attack optimization process has to include the OPF subsequent
to state estimation as a sub-problem. The resulting problem is
a bi-level optimization problem.
Generally, an optimal dispatch can be the result of different
load patterns. As a result, there are numerous solutions of
attack vector that lead to the same physical line flow on the
target line. Among these, the goal of the optimization is to
choose the one with the smallest l1-norm, and hence, l0-
norm to satisfy the limited resources constraint. This, in turn,
requires a second entry in the objective function where we
determine the sparest attack vector among the same maximal
power flow on the target branch.
The attacker’s influences over the system can be formulated
as an optimization problem (with attacker’s objective) embed-
ded with a sub-problem (with operator’s objective). Similar
to the authors in [15], [16], we model the optimal attack
problem as a bi-level optimization problem with an objective
to maximize the power flow on branch l while to change as
few states as possible:
maximize Pl − γ ‖c‖0 (16)
subject to
P = H2(θ
? − c) (17)
− LSP ≤ H1c ≤ LSPL (18)
‖c‖0 ≤ N0 (19)
5{θ?, P ?G, R?} = arg
{
min
θ,PG,R
ng∑
g=1
fg(PGg ) +
nbr∑
l=1
Pl(Rl)
}
(20)
PG −H1(θ − c)− PL = 0 (υ) (21)
−Pmax −R ≤ H2θ ≤ Pmax +R (λ+, λ−) (22)
PminG ≤ PG ≤ PmaxG (α+, α−) (23)
0 ≤ R (β) (24)
where the variables:
P is the nbr × 1 vector of branch power flow;
c is the nb × 1 attack vector;
θ, θ? are nb × 1 state variable vectors and optimal
variable solved by DCOPF, respectively;
PG, P
?
G are ng × 1 vectors of generation dispatch vari-
able and optimal generation dispatch solved by
DCOPF, respectively;
R,R? are nbr×1 vectors of the line relaxation variable,
and optimal line relaxation solved by DCOPF,
respectively;
υ is the nb × 1 dual variable vector for all equal
constraints in DCOPF;
λ+, λ− are nbr×1 dual variable vectors of the upper and
lower bound of thermal limits, respectively;
α+, α− are ng × 1 dual variable vectors of the upper and
lower bound of generator capacity, respectively;
and the parameters:
LS is the load shift factor;
PL is the nb × 1 vector of active load at each bus;
N0 is the l0-norm constraint integer;
H1 is the nb × nb matrix of dependencies between
power injection measurements and state variables;
H2 is the nnb × nb matrix of dependencies between
power flow measurements and state variables;
fg is the cost function of the gth generator;
Pl is the penalty function of relaxing the lth line;
Pmax is the nbr × 1 vector of line thermal limit;
PminG , P
max
G are ng × 1 vectors of minimum and maximum
generator output, respectively;
γ the weight of the norm of attack vector c.
We define l0-norm as appropriate quantities summed over
only the load buses. Thus, the l0-norm,‖c‖0, of the attack
vector c is defined as
‖c‖0 =
nb∑
k∈Kload
1(ck 6= 0). (25)
Recall the goal of optimization is to maximize Pl while
finding the sparsest attack among all the possible attack
vector. Thus, due to the trade-off between the maximum
power flow and the corresponding sparest attack vector, thus
the optimization objective is Pl − γ ‖c‖0. The weight γ is
chosen to be a small and positive value such it in general
contributes minimal to the objective. Note that (17)–(19) are
the attack related constraints. The constraints in (17) model the
unobservability of the attack and the constraints in (18)–(19)
model the attacker’s limited ability: the attacker can alter up to
N0 states (not necessarily alter all of them) and the resulting
change in load shift is limited to LSPL. A standard DCOPF
with a thermal limit relaxation penalty is modeled by (20)–
(24). The penalty function in (20) ensures the second level
OPF converge thus the first level problem to return a solution.
Since (19) is a modified l0-norm constraint, it is a complex
non-linear constraint and generally non-convex. In this paper,
we relax it to a corresponding l1-norm constraint as
‖c‖1 =
∑
k∈Kload
|ck| ≤ N1 (26)
where N1 is non-negative. Since (26) is a non-linear constraint
and we rewrite it as
−ck ≤ sk, ck ≤ sk,
∑
k∈Kload
sk ≤ N1. (27)
where s is a slack variable.
For the embedded OPF problem, the optimal solution can be
found at the point which satisfies the KKT optimality condition
with zero duality gap since it is a convex optimization problem
[19]. We use this fact to further replace the embedded DCOPF
problem in (20) with its KKT conditions below, along with
(21)–(24), as [
λ+;λ−;α+;α−;β
] ≥ 0 (28)
diag
([
λ+;λ−
])
([H2;−H2] θ? − [Pmax +R?] [I;−I]) = 0
(29)
diag
([
α+;α−
]) (
[I;−I]P ?G −
[
PmaxG ;−PminG
])
= 0 (30)
−diag(β)R? = 0 (31)
∇(
ng∑
g=1
fg(P
?
Gg ) +
nbr∑
l=1
Pl(R?l ))
+
[
λ+;λ−
]T ∇ ([H2;−H2] θ? − [Pmax +R?] [I;−I])
+
[
α+;α−
]T ∇ ([I;−I]P ?G − [PmaxG ;−PminG ]) (32)
−βT∇R? + υT∇[P ?G −H1(θ∗ − c)− PL] = 0
where (29)–(31) are the complementary slackness condition
for constraint (22)–(24) and (32) is the partial gradient op-
timal condition. Though (29)–(31) are non-linear, they have
specially distinctive nature. For instance, the jth equation in
(31) can be separated into two conditions associated with a
binary variable δβj{
βj ≥ 0 and −R?j = 0, if δβj = 0
βj = 0 and −R?j < 0, if δβj = 1.
(33)
In [20], a procedure is proposed to write (33) as a mixed
integer problem given as
δβj = {1, 0}, βj ≤ Cδβj , R?j ≤ C(1− δβj ). (34)
If δβj = 0, substitute (24) and (28) into (34), we have
δβj = 0, 0 ≤ βj≤0, 0 ≤ R?j ≤ Cj . (35)
Thus, if Cj is large enough to not effect the solution of R?j ,
(35) is equivalent to the complementary slackness when the
jth constraint in (24) is not an active constraint. Similarly, if
δβj = 1 and substitute (24) and (28) into (39), we have
δβj = 1, 0 ≤ βj ≤ Cj , 0 ≤ R?j ≤ 0. (36)
6Again, if Cj is large enough to not effect the solution of βj ,
(36) is equivalent to the complementary slackness when the
jth constraint in (24) is an active constraint. Therefore, (34) is
equivalent to (31).
Thus, the whole problem becomes the mixed-integer linear
program
maximize Pl − γ
∑
k∈Kload sk
subject to
(17)–(18), (21)–(24), (27)–(28), (32)
δ±λ = {1, 0}
λ±≤ Cδ±λ
−H2θ? + Pmax +R? ≤ C(1− δ+λ )
+H2θ
? + Pmax +R? ≤ C(1− δ−λ )
(37)

δ±α = {1, 0}
α±≤ Cδ±α
−P ?G + PmaxG ≤ C(1− δ+α )
P ?G − PminG ≤ C(1− δ−α )
(38)
 δβ = {1, 0}β ≤ Cδβ
R? ≤ C(1− δβ)
(39)
where δ±λ , δ
±
α and δβ are binary variables and C is a large
constant.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we run the optimization problem defined in
Sec. IV on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system to find an optimal
attack vector c. Subsequently, we use this attack vector c to
simulate an AC attack described in Sec. III-C and given by
(15) against a non-linear system model involving AC state
estimation and ACOPF. AC power flow, AC state estimation,
and ACOPF are implemented with MATPOWER toolbox in
MATLAB. For the optimization problem, we use CPLEX as
the solver.
A. Solution for the optimization problem
We highlight results of two scenarios for the RTS-24-bus
system: one with original rating and one with reduced rating.
The one with original rating represents a system without
congestion prior to attack and the one with reduced rating
represent a congested system.
Second, we define an attack as feasible if the resulting
change in power flow is more than 1% of the power flow
value prior to the attack. This is to distinguish the cases
with no or minor changes on target branch power flow Pl
after attack from those with large changes. We furthermore
define a feasible attack to be successful if the target branch is
overloaded after attack. We choose γ to be 1% of the original
power flow value of the target branch.
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate relevant statistics for the non-
congested and congested systems, respectively, when the N1
constraint is set to be infinite. That is, the attacker has control
over all measurements of the system and can change as many
measurements as it wishes. The congested system is modeled
with all branch ratings decreased by 50%. There are three
Figure 3. Statistic summary of 38 attack scenarios for the omnipotent attacker
with the non-congested system.
Figure 4. Statistic summary of 38 attack scenarios for the omnipotent attacker
with the congested system.
subplots in both Figs. 3 and 4. Subplot (a) shows the maximal
power flow on branch 10 (based on our observation, this is
the attack with the maximal power flow, i.e., the worst-case
attack); subplot (b) shows the average l0-norm of attack vector
c over all feasible cases; and subplot (c) shows the percentage
of feasible and successful attacks.
For both non-congested and congested scenarios, we ob-
7serve that the maximal power flow increases as LS constraint
relaxes in Figs. 3(a) and 4(a). In Fig. 4(a), we observe a
plateau after LS > 50%. It is due to the generator location and
capacity limitation and the fact that the line flow on branch 10
cannot be increased anymore. From Figs. 3(b) and 4(b), as LS
constraint relaxes, it is easier to attack the system since the
average l0-norm decreases and the attacker needs to change
fewer bus states. It is due to the fact, for some cases, that the
maximal power is saturated when the LS constraint relaxes.
The attacker effectively concentrates the change of loads on
fewer buses with heavy loads therefore changes fewer bus
states. From Figs. 3(c) and 4(c), we observe that the attacker
can find more feasible cases as LS constraint relaxes. Even
if the attacker has full control over the system meters, its
influence over the system is extremely limited by the load shift
constraint. For instance, from Fig. 3(c), when LS = 20%, the
attacker cannot find any feasible attacks while the attacker can
find 12 feasible attacks when LS = 30%.
Comparing Figs. 3 and 4, the congested system is more
vulnerable to our FDI attack. For a non-congested system,
from Fig. 3(c), the attacker cannot generate any successful
attack. On the other hand, in Fig. 4(c), the feasible and success-
ful attack percentage increases as LS constraint increases for
the congested system. This is expected because the RTS-24-
bus system has redundant transmission capacity for reliability
reasons and reducing all the line ratings proportionally will
create a more stressed system. In conclusion, a congested
system is naturally favored by the attacker. Thus, for the rest
of the simulation, we only consider the congested system to
illustrate the attack consequences.
Now we discuss the l1-norm constraint. To understand the
effect of the sparsity constraint, we fix the LS constraint
and solve the proposed optimization problem for different l1-
norm constraint (N1) and for all target branches. In Fig. 5,
the maximal power flow on the target branch is plotted as a
function of the l1-norm constraint for a successful attack on
target branch 17. The kink in Fig. 5 represents point of which
the attack is large enough to cause a different set of generators
to be dispatched.
Fig. 6 illustrates the effect of the γ term in the objective
function of our optimization problem for target branch 17.
There are three sub-plots illustrating the following as a func-
tion of the l1-norm constraint N1: (a) the maximal power flow,
(b) the l1-norm , and (c) the l0-norm of the attack vector,
respectively. In each subplot, we plot two curves, one with γ
set to zero and one with the chosen weight of γ coefficient.
Subplot (a) demonstrates that the γ term does not decrease
the resulting maximal power flow at all. Subplot (b) shows
that once the maximal power flow saturates, introducing the
γ term causes the optimization problem to find the smallest
attack vector in l1-norm. This result in a stabilization of the
l0-norm as shown in subplot (c) in contrast to the γ = 0 case.
B. Attack consequences for a non-linear model
We now use the attack vector from the optimization problem
to perform the AC attack described in Sec. III-C. If the attacker
keeps injecting false data, the attack as well as the overload on
Figure 5. The maximal power flow v.s. the l1 -norm constraints with different
load shift tolerance at target branch 17 (bus 10– bus 12).
Figure 6. The l1-norm and l0-norm of solved attack vector c v.s. the l1-
norm constraint (N1) when load shift (LS ) is limited by 30%; target branch
17 (bus 10– bus 12).
the branches will be sustained until the system configuration
changes.
In this subsection, we assume a system with a complete set
of measurements, i.e., both active and reactive power flows
are measured at two ends of each branch and both active
and reactive injection are measured at each load bus, which
makes 186 measurements in total. Measurement error, as in
(1), is assumed to have zero mean and variance 10−4. During
the simulation, we assume the physical load is unchanged.
Note that, to make the system congested, all ratings of the
branches are decreased by 50%. However, because of the
existence of the reactive power, the convergence of ACOPF
is not guaranteed. Thus, in order to compare AC and DC
attack, certain ratings of branches in ACOPF have to be
relaxed manually. We solve the optimization problem for target
branch 17 and LS = 30%. Fig. 7(a) compares the maximal
power flow from the optimization problem (recall: DCOPF
used in the optimization problem) with the physical power
flow (active and apparent power) in the non-linear system after
attack. In this scenario, the rating of branch 10 (bus 6–bus
8(a) Comparison of DC optimization solution and AC maximal ac-
tive/apparent power flow on target branch 17
(b) Power flow on branch 12, 23, and 28
Figure 7. Attack simulation on AC system model
10) are relaxed to 145 MVA. Note that in the absent of the
attack, i.e., N1 = 0, the power flow for AC and DC OPFs
result in sightly different power flow, however, as the attacker
size is increased, the power flows closely track each other. In
particularly, the AC attack successfully overloads branch 17.
Branches as 12, 23, and 28 are also overloaded even though
the attacker has not targeted on them, as shown in Fig. 7(b).
Since branch 23 and 28 are congested prior to attack, once the
generation is redispatched as a result of the attack, the power
flow on these branches will change and in some cases it leads
to overloads. Branch 12, while not congested prior to attack,
suffers an overload due to the fact that it lies in the path of
power delivering to branch 17.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper analyzed the physical consequences of false data
injection attacks on power system state estimation. An attack
framework was introduced in which the attacker matches the
non-linear AC system characteristics by implementing local
AC state estimation to a small number of measurements.
Subsequently, a linear optimization problem was formulated to
find the worst-case line overload attack. Numerical simulation
was performed to test the resulting attacks on the IEEE-RTS-
24-bus system. We found that, aside from the size of the attack
subgraph, the constraint that an attack not cause significant
observed load shift at the control center significantly impacts
the attacker’s ability to overload a branch. Still, there exists
attacks with mild load shift that cause overloads.
Extensions include attacks targeted to overload multiple
lines; this was an inadvertent side effect of our attacks, but a
more targeted effort may cause more extreme damage or even
cascading outages. Secondly, the linear optimization problem
may be extended to a more accurate non-linear problem.
Finally, using accurate load statistics to detect abnormal load
patterns caused by FDI attacks could further restrict the space
of undetectable attacks.
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